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Abstract
This paper reassesses the causes of Chicago bank failures during the Great Depression
by tracking the evolution of their balance sheets in the 1920s. I find that all Chicago banks
suffered tremendous deposit withdrawals; however banks that failed earlier in the 1930s had
invested more in mortgages in the 1920s. The main problem with mortgages was their lack
of liquidity, not their quality. Banks heavily engaged in mortgages did not have enough
liquid assets to face the withdrawals, and failed. This paper thus reasserts the importance
of pre-crisis liquidity risk management in preventing bank failures. While not excluding
an important role for lenders of last resort as a within-crisis solution, emphasis on banks’
long-term investments in illiquid assets implies a role for regulatory authorities in crisis
prevention.
JEL Classification: G11, G21 and N22
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Introduction
The recent financial crisis has revived interest in the causes of bank failures. A lively and
ongoing debate on Depression banking panics in the United States has drawn increasing
attention to the significance of illiquidity and falling asset values as causes of bank failure. On
the one hand, there is compelling evidence that exogenous falls in the value of bank assets had
a significant impact on the likelihood of survival (Calomiris and Mason 1997, 2003; Esbitt
1986; Guglielmo 1998; Temin 1976; Thomas 1935; White 1984). On the other hand, there is
also evidence that liquidity mattered (Friedman and Schwartz 1963; Wheelock 1991; Wicker
1996). For instance, Carlson, Mitchener, and Richardson (2011) and Richardson and Troost
(2009) show that liquidity provision by the central bank reduced the risk of bank failure. In
the same vein, Mitchener and Richardson (2013) show that interbank deposit withdrawals
unrelated to target banks’ internal conditions increased their probability of failure.
These results highlight the fact that both exogenous insolvency risk (falls in asset values)
and illiquidity risk can contribute to bank failure risk. In fact, deposit withdrawals rarely
occur in the absence of a shock to asset values. As depositors are usually risk-intolerant, even
small shocks to insolvency risk can cause solvent banks to fail through large deposit
withdrawals (Calomiris and Gorton 1991). Most authors of empirical studies of these
questions agree that exogenous insolvency risk rose for all banks in the Depression and that it
was one of the main factors behind the mass withdrawals witnessed at the time. Even
Friedman and Schwartz (1963) concede that the “contagion of fear” leading to banking panics
partly orginated in agricultural regions where output had fallen since the end of the First
World War.1
The central problem is thus not so much to determine which of these two factors caused
banks to fail; rather it is to determine the relative importance of each. A pertinent question to
ask is how important endogenous illiquidity risk was, above and beyond any observed
exogenous increase in insolvency risk. Bank failures could have occurred either because the
exogenous shock to assets was very large, or because only a small shock occurred but those
banks were highly illiquid. For instance, imagine two banks which have identical exogenous
declines in their asset values and have the same leverage, which means they have identical
1See also, for example, Calomiris and Kahn (1991) and Calomiris and Wilson (2004).
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exogenous increases in insolvency risk. As a consequence, both banks experience similar
deposit outflows. But one of them has enough cash to handle those withdrawals, while the
other does not, and consequently fails. This would be an example of cross-sectional differences
in survival primarily driven by liquidity risk. Note that what is driving failure risk here is not
exogenous liquidity risk (deposit withdrawals) but endogenous liquidity risk: the fact that the
second bank was less liquid ex ante than the first one.
The aim of this paper is to answer this question for Great Depression Chicago, which had
one of the highest urban bank failure rates in the country.2 It extends the existing literature
on Chicago (notably Calomiris and Mason (1997)) by using extant balance sheet data from as
early as 1923 to focus specifically on the long-run relative importance of each pre-crisis
financial ratio in predicting failure.3 In particular, this study makes explicitly clear that some
pre-crisis balance sheet items are linked to banks’ liquidity, not just to banks’ future
probability of incurring losses. For example, cash holdings are obviously linked to banks’
capacity to meet cash withdrawals. Similarly, long-term loans can be riskier from a liquidity
point of view, because of the increased maturity mismatch. Some balance sheet items are thus
intrinsically less liquid than others, regardless of their quality. With this in mind, I separate
bank failures into three cohorts ordered through time (1931, 1932 and 1933 failures) and
examine the evolution of their balance sheets over the whole decade of 1923-1933.
My first finding is that, while depositors ran on all banks, what really differentiated
banks’ probability of failure was the size of their real estate loan investments in the pre-crisis
period. Examining cohorts of bank failures graphically through time, I show that they are
most clearly ordered in terms of their mortgage holdings: the more a bank held in mortgages,
the earlier it failed. The ordering is not so clear for other balance sheet items, such as capital,
reserves, stocks and bonds, and other loans. This is confirmed econometrically by an ordered
logistic model, which suggests that mortgages have the largest predictive power.
More importantly, the results emphasize mortgages’ inherent lack of liquidity as a
determinant risk factor. There are three reasons to think that the quality of mortgages did
2Out of 193 state banks in June 1929, only 35 survived up to June 1933.
3Calomiris and Mason (1997) found that banks that failed during the summer 1932 crisis had more in common
with other banks that failed earlier in 1932 than with survivors, thereby suggesting that widespread depositor
fear was not the primary cause of failure. In particular, these banks had lower ratios of reserves to demand
deposits, lower ratios of retained earnings to net worth, and higher proportions of long-term debt in December
1931. They also lost more deposits in 1931. See also Thomas (1935), Esbitt (1986), and Guglielmo (1998).
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not play a significant role. First, most mortgages had a 50 percent loan-to-value (LTV) ratio,
while land values fell by less than 50 percent in Chicago before 1933. This means that banks
cannot have incurred any significant losses on defaulting loans. Second, mortgages had longer
contract maturities (three to five years) than other loans, and even longer de facto maturities.
Long maturities, the absence of secondary markets and the impossibility of rediscounting
these loans at the Federal Reserve meant that they were inherently less liquid than other
types of loans. Third, I show that locational differences in land values within Chicago did not
have a differential impact on bank failure rates.
The view that illiquid assets were the main cause of failure is supported by evidence that
all banks engaged in fire sales of other loans and securities. In this process, mortgages could
not be liquidated. Indeed, real estate loans increased as a share of total assets for all banks
during the Depression, at the same time as assets as a whole were declining. Other types of
loans, such as loans on collateral security and “other loans,” were promptly liquidated.
These findings suggest significant policy implications from a regulatory point of view.
They show that long-term investments in illiquid assets play an important role in bank failure.
This does not rule out a role for lenders of last resort as a within-crisis solution. But it does
suggest a role for regulatory authorities in crisis prevention, namely ensuring that banks meet
liquidity requirements such as maintaining healthy cash ratios. Such regulatory measures may
include, for instance, renewed emphasis on cash ratios or other liquidity requirements. This is
all the more important given that central banks cannot always accurately predict the quality
of banks’ collateral (especially in the case of assets maturing at a much later date), making
central banks’ task a highly complex and possibly imperfect one (Goodhart 2010).4
Making banks responsible for their liquidity risk management – not just for their credit
risk management – is an idea that has only taken hold in the past few years (Goodhart 2008).
While it was considered an important aspect of bank regulation from the nineteenth century
to the early twentieth century in the United States, it was then more or less abandoned, to be
replaced since the 1980s by a much more pressing focus on credit risk, and, in particular,
capital requirements. Liquidity requirements were indeed almost absent from the Basel I and
4Note that the interpretation presented in this paper significantly contrasts with Diamond and Dybvig (1983),
who argue that bank runs are usually undesirable phenomena that cause even “healthy” banks to fail. Although
in their view “healthy” usually means “solvent,” I suggest that a relatively solvent but particularly illiquid bank
ex ante is not necessarily healthy. To some extent banks should be prepared for out-of-equilibrium events such
as runs.
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Basel II regulations, and only recently made a comeback in the Basel III regulations.5
The results of this paper also invite a reassessment of the role of real estate in the Great
Depression. While largely unmatched, Chicago’s real estate boom resembled both in character
and magnitude the suburban booms of other major cities in the East North Central region.
This region also experienced one of the highest numbers of bank suspensions in the country.6
A number of recent papers have shown that, in the aggregate, the direct contribution of real
estate to the decline in economic activity was small (Field 2013; White 2009).7 This paper
assesses its possible indirect contribution via the banking channel.8
Chicago banks in the building boom
In the 1920s Chicago experienced one of the largest real estate booms in the country,
partly as a result of circumstances created by World War I. In the first place, a near embargo
on labour and building material created a housing shortage which realtors were eager to
compensate for after the war (U.S. Congress 1921). In addition, the war led to a substantial
boom in agricultural goods and land, which quickly gave way to a deep recession in farming
areas when the war came to an end. As a flourishing business centre lying next to the vast but
weakened agricultural lands of the Midwest, Chicago profited from this situation perhaps
more than any other city in the United States.
Progress in economic activity and the near-constant arrival of new inhabitants in search of
higher wages brought an excitement to the city that led to a significant construction boom
(see James (1938, p. 939), Allen (1931) and Sakolski (1966)). Figure 1 shows that building
construction reached a peak in 1925-1926. From 1918 to 1926 the population of Chicago
increased by 35 percent, while the number of lots subdivided in the Chicago Metropolitan
5However it is important to note that so-called liquidity-coverage ratios can lead to confusion and to regulatory
arbitrage due to their complexity. Perhaps focusing on simple cash ratios would be a better alternative.
6The Chicago boom can be compared in particular to those of Detroit, Pittsburgh, Philadelphia (see Wicker
1996, pp. 16,18), and Toledo (Messer-Kruse 2004). See also Allen (1931). For aggregate data on bank suspensions
by region, see Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1937, p. 868).
7Both White (2009) and Field (2013) study the relationship between housing and the Depression nationally
and argue that the 1920s real estate boom cannot have been an important cause of the following slump – some
of their arguments related to commercial banking will be examined below. Temin (1976) dwells very little on the
real estate market and simply mentions that a fall in construction may have been at the origin of the contraction.
Snowden analyzes the mortgage market in the 1920s and 1930s, without attempting to determine the existence
of a causal link with the Depression (Snowden 2003, 2010).
8Some studies have also emerged focusing on the government’s policy response to mortgage distress in the
1930s (Fishback, Horrace, and Kantor 2001; Fishback, Horrace, Kantor, Lagunes, and Treber 2009; Fishback,
Rose, and Snowden 2013; Rose 2011; Wheelock 2008).
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Region increased by 3,000 percent (Hoyt 1933, p. 237).9
Figure 1: Annual number of new buildings in Chicago
Source: Hoyt (1933, p.475).
Commercial banks were not the only real estate lenders, but they played an important
role in allowing this boom to develop.10 Granted, nationally-chartered banks were heavily
restricted by law in terms of mortgage lending, and their assets made up nearly 40 percent of
all bank assets (University of Illinois Bulletin 1929). First National rivaled in size the largest
bank in Chicago, Continental Illinois, which was state-chartered. As a contemporary made
clear, “by the summer of 1929 ... the Continental Illinois and the First National towered over
the Chicago money market like giants” (James 1938, p. 952).11 Nevertheless, a huge number
of small unit banks swarmed around the city, most of them state-chartered and therefore only
lightly constrained by law (White 1983). As James put it, “around these great banks of the
Loop, there nestled, however, some 300 outlying commercial banks, each of which appeared
microscopic [alongside] the Continental or the First although, in the aggregate, they handled a
considerable proportion of the city’s business.” In December 1929, state banks made up 95.5
percent of all banks in the city (University of Illinois Bulletin 1929).
These small banks were usually unable to branch, due to restrictive state banking laws in
Illinois. Consequently most of them catered to their local communities, investing in local
projects, often in real estate. This is suggested by James (1938, p.954), who notes: “each of
9See also (Fisher 1928, p. 3).
10Individuals, B&Ls, and mutual savings banks were often more prevalent lenders in the country as a whole
(Snowden 2010). However Bayless and Bodfish (1928) point out that Chicago was atypical in that commercial
banks supplied at least 50 percent of the market.
11Indeed, together they were responsible “for about half of the banking business transacted in the city” (ibid.).
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these banks represented a financial centre for the community it served, and anything that
concerned the bank was of outstanding local importance.” Similarly, Hoyt (1933, p. 249)
emphasizes that “outlying banks furnished depositories for local funds and collected
neighborhood savings for reinvestment in local building projects” (see also James (1938,
pp. 944, 953,954, 993) and Hoyt (1933, p. 270)). James also speculated that the soundness of
the banks was “intimately related to the building boom” (James 1938, p. 953).12
Soon after the Depression started, several waves of banking crises shook the country.
Chicago was probably one of the worst hit cities (Wicker 1996). Deposit withdrawals began as
early as 1930, gained pace in early 1931 and redoubled in 1932, especially during the summer,
as was documented by Calomiris and Mason (1997). A significant number of banks survived
the first waves of panic but many failed later on. 1933 saw the last banking panic, which
eliminated a few more banks before giving way to a long-needed respite.
Data
The principal aim of this paper is to understand the specific factors that might have led banks
to fail in these different waves, and in particular to examine what might have contributed to
the timing of their failure. In this section I provide details on the data used and the
underlying empirical framework.
The Statements of State Banks of Illinois are the most detailed and accessible
semi-annual source of balance sheet data, though they only report on state-chartered banks
(both members and non-members of the Federal Reserve System).13 These banks generally
reported at the end of June and December of each year, which allows me to look at balance
sheets in all years from 1923 up to 1933 for the first time. The years 1920-22 are recession
years and are not examined in this study (see James (1938, p. 939) and Hoyt (1933, p. 236)).
The full dataset includes: December 1923, December 1924, June 1925, June 1926, June 1927,
June and December 1928, June and December 1930, June and December 1931, June and
December 1932 and June 1933. All Statements give asset book values. I also make use of
12Had they been allowed to branch, they would have likely been able to better diversify their assets and prepare
for a sudden backlash (Carlson 2001; Calomiris and Mason 2003; Mitchener 2005). See the Appendix for a more
complete discussion of the role of unit (and chain) banking in the Chicago boom.
13See the previous section and the Appendix for information on national banks and reasons for their exclusion
from this study.
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Rand McNally Bankers Directory, a recognized source for tracking down bank name changes
and consolidations (see the Appendix for more detail) .
I divide banks into four cohorts: survivors, June 31 failures, June 32 failures, and June 33
failures. The survivor category tracks each bank and only includes the banks present at every
point in time from June 1929 to June 1933. This system allows me to create a balanced
sample over the Depression period .14
Table 1: Classification of Great Depression Cohorts
Bank existed? Jun
1929
Dec
1929
Jun
1930
Dec
1930
Jun
1931
Dec
1931
Jun
1932
Dec
1932
Jun
1933
Survivors Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
June 1931 fail-
ures
Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No No
June 1932 fail-
ures
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No
June 1933 fail-
ures
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
The choice of the windows of failure was necessarily somewhat arbitrary, but not entirely
so. Chicago was hardest hit by banking crises in the spring of 1931 and in the spring and early
June of 1932 (Wicker 1996, pp. 68-9, 112). Thus selecting the banks that failed between
January and June 1931 and banks that failed between January and June 1932 allows me to
include banks that were especially affected by banking crises as well as non-panic failures.
There is no 1930 cohort. This is because the wave of bank failures following that of Caldwell
and Company in November 1930 was mainly confined to the southern regions of Tennessee,
Arkansas and Kentucky (Wicker 1996, p. 58). By contrast the early 1933 crisis was
nationwide, prompting me to analyze the few banks that failed in Chicago at the time (Wicker
1996, p. 108).15 In general, while some banks failed before - and between - these cohorts, I
selected the cohorts that seemed most important to explain Chicago bank failures.
Table 1 shows the different cohorts and the corresponding reporting dates. Following
White (1984), I exclude the few banks that closed and later reopened. Including them in the
analysis does not significantly change the results. Often some cohort banks were not present
14For the same reason it is reasonable to make each cohort “exclusive” in the sense that each cohort excludes
the banks that failed before the “window of failure” for the whole cohort. For example, the June 1931 failure
cohort does not include banks that had failed by December 1930. It only includes banks that had survived until
December 1930 and failed between the start of 1931 and June of that year.
15Although some may argue that many of these banks failed for exogenous reasons (many of these closures
where ordered by the government).
8
Table 2: Survivors and failures
Number
of
Survivors
Number
of June
1931
Failures
Number
of June
1932
Failures
Number
of June
1933
Failures
Failure
Rate (as %
of the 193
banks
existing in
June 1929)
Compound
Failure
Rate
Dec 1923 28 28 27 7
Dec 1924 30 37 31 8
June 1925 31 38 30 8
June 1926 32 39 34 9
June 1927 31 40 34 9
June 1928 33 44 36 11
Dec 1928 31 41 35 12
June 1929 35 46 36 14 0 0
Dec 1929 35 46 36 14 7 7
June 1930 35 46 36 14 6 12
Dec 1930 35 46 36 14 7 19
June 1931 35 46 36 14 24 43
Dec 1931 35 46 36 14 10 53
June 1932 35 46 36 14 18 72
Dec 1932 35 46 36 14 3 74
June 1933 35 46 36 14 9 83
Notes: The 193 banks in total for June 1929 mentioned in the sixth column and in the introduction
include those that are not part of any cohort, eg. those that failed between the chosen windows of
failure. The actual bank total for June 1929 as the sum of each cohort is 131. Source: Statements
of State Banks of Illinois.
in every year from 1923 to 1928. For example, there are 46 June 1931 failures, but only 39 of
them were present in June 1926.16 The resulting variation in sample sizes will not directly
affect the econometric analysis of the pre-1929 period, since ordered logistic regression only
uses cross-sections in one particular year. Table 2 shows the sample sizes for each cohort at
various points in time.17
A consolidation was “the corporate union of two or more banks into one bank which
continued operations as a single business entity and under a single charter” (Richardson 2007).
During the Depression, mergers were described colloquially as “shotgun weddings,” whereas
takeovers were part of the “purge and merge system” (James 1938, p. 994). Merger and
takeover are usually considered in the literature as major signs of weakness. I follow Calomiris
and Mason (2003) in counting as failures banks that were taken over by other banks. This
occurred in 14 cases from June 1929, though the results are robust to a different treatment.
16This number may fluctuate between December 1923 and June December 1928 as, say, a fall from 40 to 39
banks may occur twice if different banks have appeared and disappeared.
17Note that in the regression models below sample sizes may not exactly equal those shown here. The reason
is that some of these banks lacked data for some explanatory variables (including, for instance, such crucial
variables as total deposits) and were thus automatically excluded by the statistical software.
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The treatment of mergers that ended up failing can be tricky because it is not clear which
of the two parties in the merger was the weakest. A healthy bank may have merged with a
less healthy bank which then dragged the former into bankruptcy. So instead of categorizing
such mergers as a failure of both banks at the time of merger, when possible I kept both banks
alive by splitting the merger’s balance sheet in parts proportional to the size of each bank. In
addition, I expressed the failure of a merger as the failure of the two merged banks.18
Empirical results
A study of Chicago bank balance sheets shows that deposit losses alone cannot explain
bank failures. An analysis of the same balance sheets, using an ordered logistic model, shows
that mortgage lending is an important part of the explanation. In this section I deal with
these two points in turn.
Deposit losses
Firstly, consider deposit losses. Key variables used here are the cumulative rates of decline
in deposits19 from the end of June 1929 to December 1930, from June 1929 to December 1931,
and from June 1929 to December 1932. The deposit data is based on the last call before
failure, which for some failures was almost six months before their failure date. The deposit
losses of banks failing during any of the major panics of April 1931 and June 1932 incurred
during this period are therefore not reflected in the variables.20 Figure 2 shows the cumulative
growth rate of total deposits, and Table 8 in the Appendix shows each cohort mean as well as
tests of differences between them.
Clearly, all banks lost tremendous amounts of deposits. In 1930 the first failure cohort lost
on average 22 percent of their deposits, and in December 1931 the second, third and survivor
cohorts had lost respectively 59 percent, 43 percent and 37 percent. Looking at 1930, the
difference in deposit losses between the first failure cohort and survivors is only borderline
significant, and is not significant when compared to other failure cohorts. On the other hand,
18The results are robust either way. The Appendix provides more detail on each merger, on the fate of
Continental Illinois, and on name changes.
19Total deposits include demand deposits, time deposits and due to other banks.
20A survival model for the liability side is available in the Appendix. It confirms the importance of deposit
losses in predicting failure, while rejecting any significant role for capital.
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Figure 2: Mean cumulative growth rate of total deposits (base time: June 1929)
Source: Statements.
a year later the magnitude of the second failure cohort’s withdrawals significantly differs from
survivors’; this may be due to a learning effect.21 Yet even in this case deposit losses were very
large for survivors (around 37 percent compared to 59 percent for June 1932 failures). More
importantly, by June 1932, survivors themselves had lost 60 percent of total deposits.22 This
suggests that all banks suffered a severe liquidity shock, and that differences in cumulative
deposit withdrawals cannot easily explain bank failure.
Ex ante balance sheet ratios
If deposits cannot by themselves explain why some banks failed and others did not, other
aspects of bank balance sheets should help explain this difference. This section examines some
of the most important pre-crisis ratios that are related to bank health. Graphical analysis and
a logistical model suggest that real estate loans were more significant than other ratios – such
as capital, government bonds and other loans – as predictors of bank failure. I deal in turn
21Note that these figures differ slightly from Calomiris and Mason (1997)’s as their sample included national
banks as well. Their survivor category also includes my June 1933 failures cohort.
22Note that some central-reserve city banks in the Loop, most of which ended up surviving, benefited from an
inflow of deposits in the summer 1931 crisis as outlying banks closed and some of the money was redeposited in
the Loop banks (see, in particular, Mitchener and Richardson (2013) and U.S. Congress (1934, part 2, p. 1062)).
Despite such inflows their total cumulative deposit losses were very large, as Figure 2 suggests.
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Figure 3: Real estate loans to total assets (all categories)
Source: Statements.
with the graphical analysis and the logistic model. Note that geometric means are used
throughout due to the ratios’ right skew.23
Figure 3 shows the share of real estate loans (both residential and commercial) to total
assets by cohort from 1923 onwards.24 In the pre-Depression era, survivors often had the
lowest mortgage share during most of the 1920s, followed closely by June 1933 failures. June
1932 failures had a substantially higher share, and the June 1931 failures share was even
higher. Interestingly, some form of divergence between June 1932 failures and survivors from
around 1926 onwards is also noticeable, and this difference becomes significantly larger
starting in June 1928. This is evidence that the banks which failed earlier were those that had
invested more in real estate loans as early as 1923. In other words, the share of mortgages at
least partly explains not only the event of failure but also its timing. No other balance sheet
item is as clearly graphically ordered as mortgage holdings (see Figures 4 and 6 in the last
section, and Figures 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 and 13 in the Appendix).
It is interesting to note that some of the banks that invested the least in real estate were
also very large banks: in June 1929 Continental Illinois had .7 percent, Central Trust
23Right skews are common in financial ratios. See Lev and Sunder (1979), Mcleay and Trigueiros (2002), and
Tippett (1990)). I thank Mark Tippett for extensive statistical advice on the study of financial ratios.
24There is no decomposition of real estate loans on the books of Chicago state banks.
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Company of Illinois around 2 percent, Harris Trust and Savings .05 percent, and the Northern
Trust Company .7 percent.25 This in itself suggests the necessity of using a regression
framework, which would allow me to test the importance of mortgages in predicting bank
failure while controlling for other factors such as bank size.
A simple way to do so is to introduce an ordered logistic model, which for this study
presents several advantages over other estimation procedures. While in binary logistic models
the outcome variable can only take one of two values (“survivor” or “failure”), ordered logistic
regression allows the outcome variable to include several categories of failure, as well as the
survivor one. And while a discrete-time hazard framework necessarily takes into account
within (ie. post-1929) Depression variables, ordered logistic models allow me to focus
exclusively on the impact of pre-Depression variables on the outcome.26 This matters because
external shocks may affect bank variables during the Depression, whereas ex ante variables are
more likely to reflect banks’ pre-Depression portfolio decisions, which are the subject of this
study. I report discrete-time hazard estimations in the Appendix for reference.
The dependent variable in the ordered logit model is thus an ordinal variable
(failure type) in which each category represents a bank’s failure type. The categories are
ordered so that the first category is June 1931 failure (1), the second category is June 1932
failure (2), the third category is June 1933 failure (3), and the last category is Survivor (4).
Formally, I estimate a probabilistic model of bank failure such that
failure type = α+ β1size+ β2capital + β3reserve dep+ β4gvtbonds+ β5secloans
+β6mortgages+ β7other re+ β8otherloans+ β9bankhouse
+β10rearnings+ β11age+ 
(1)
where size is a value of bank size, capital is the capital ratio, reserve dep is the reserve-deposit
25See also the Appendix on bank size. One may also wonder how a non-increasing share of real estate to total
assets may have substantially weakened banks. Mortgage growth rates are also shown.
26A discrete-time hazard model necessarily includes time-varying covariates up until the time of failure or
censoring, which in this dataset occurred mainly during, not before, the Depression. Although it is in theory
possible to test the significance of pre-Depression variables by adding interactions with time dummies, it is not
possible to do so with this dataset as the hazard rate is very often zero prior to 1929. A hazard rate of zero means
that time dummies will perfectly predict failure, which leads to such dummies being automatically omitted from
the model.
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Table 3: Variable definitions
Variable Description
failure type ordinal dependent variable (1: June 1931 failure; 2:
June 1932 failure; 3: June 1933 failure; 4: Survivor)
size log (total assets)
capital capital÷ total assets
reserve dep (cash balances + due from other banks)÷
(demand deposits + time deposits + due to other banks)
gvtbonds government bonds÷ total assets
secloans loans on security collateral÷ total assets
mortgages real estate loans (all categories)÷ total assets
other re other real estate÷ total assets
otherloans other loans÷ total assets
bankhouse banking house÷ total assets
rearnings retained earnings÷ total capital
age dummy 1 = existed in May 1920;
0 = did not exist in May 1920
Notes: All variables except for size and age have been multiplied by 100 to
ease interpretation of the odds ratios. The variable mortgages contains both
residential and commercial mortgages as no decomposition was available on the
original bank statements.
ratio, gvtbds is the share of U.S. government bonds, secloans represents loans on security
collateral (short-term loans backed by stock-market securities), mortgages is the share of real
estate loans, other re is the share of repossessed real estate after foreclosure, othloans is the
share of other loans, bankhouse is the share banking house, furniture and fixtures (bank
expenses), rearngs is retained earnings to net worth (a common measure of bank
profitability),27 and age is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a bank already existed in May 1920
and zero otherwise. A detailed description of each variable can be found in Table 3.
Table 4 presents the results for this model, in odds ratios. Each column represents a
separate regression in which predictors are restricted to one particular year. For instance, the
1923 column helps find out which 1923 variables best predict failure during the Depression.
Clearly, many ratios predict failure quite well throughout the pre-Depression period. In
particular, government bonds, other loans and especially retained earnings to net worth
significantly each reduce the likelihood of failure. The relative importance of the latter is also
illustrated in Figure 11 in the Appendix, which is quite reminiscent of that of real estate
loans, and is interesting in that the last failing cohort behaves quite differently from survivors
after 1926.
27On 1929 financial statements retained earnings appear in the form of “undivided profits” or “the volume of
recognized accumulated profits which have not yet been paid out in dividends.” See Rodkey (1944, p. 108) and
Van Hoose (2010, p. 12).
14
Table 4: Ordered logistic model of bank failure (odds ratios), 1923-1929 (dependent vari-
able: failure type)
Dec
1923
Dec
1924
Jun
1925
Jun
1926
Jun
1927
Jun
1928
Dec
1928
Jun
1929
size 1.620 1.421 1.207 1.708** 1.568 1.206 1.120 1.196
(.56) (.43) (.29) (.49) (.46) (.31) (.28) (.27)
capital 1.027 .978 1.059 1.026 1.051 1.057 1.056 1.020
(.06) (.04) (.04) (.04) (.04) (.04) (.04) (.04)
reserve dep 1.036 1.037 1.059 .988 .935 .965 .970 1.007
(.05) (.04) (.04) (.03) (.04) (.04) (.02) (.02)
gvtbonds 1.070* 1.044 1.070* 1.046 1.048 1.070 1.061 1.141**
(.04) (.04) (.04) (.05) (.05) (.06) (.05) (.06)
secloans .987 1.020 1.025 .999 1.035 1.030 1.044** 1.023
(.03) (.03) (.03) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02)
mortgages .937** .928** .951* .919*** .940** .940** .930** .927***
(.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03)
other re .985 1.037 .937 .560** .477* .670 .568 .776
(.12) (.09) (.12) (.15) (.20) (.23) (.24) (.18)
otherloans 1.012 .971 .969* .978 .951** .973 .938** 1.003
(.02) (.02) (.02) (02) (.02) (.02) (.02) (.02)
bankhouse .961 1.000 .939 1.072 .992 .922 .940 1.003
(.08) (.08) (.07) (.05) (.07) (.06) (.05) (.06)
rearnings .995 1.030 1.025 1.057** 1.068** 1.035 1.036 1.060**
(.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.03) (.02) (.03) (.03)
age .828 1.103 1.334 1.294 1.664 2.189* 3.249** 1.290
(.49) (.55) (.64) (.64) (.80) (1.00) (1.55) (.55)
n 86 102 103 111 112 122 116 128
Prob > chi2 .006 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
Likelihood -98.78 -109.87 -111.91 -119.98 -116.85 -135.62 -125.21 -140.32
Notes: *** significant at α = 0.01, ** significant at α = 0.05, * significant at α = 0.10. The dependent
variable (failure type) is an ordinal one, ordered in the following way: 1. June 1931 failure; 2. June 1932
failure; 3. June 1933 failure; 4. Survivor. Each column represents a separate model run with variables
taken each year before the start of the Depression. The table shows odds ratios, with standard errors
based on the original coefficients in parentheses. An odds ratio above one increases the likelihood of
survival, whereas an odds ratio below one decreases it. Each variable except for size and age has been
multiplied by 100 so that a one unit increase can be interpreted as a one percentage increase in the
ratio. Source: Statements.
Of greater interest is the role of the real estate loan share. This variable stands out as the
most important overall. Already in December 1923, for a one percent increase in the
proportion of mortgages to total assets, the odds of surviving versus failing (all failure
categories combined) were .94 times lower, holding other variables constant in the model.28
This coefficient retains its significant predictive power compared to all other variables
throughout the 1920s, up to the eve of the Depression (June 1929). No other variables is as
consistently significant as the real estate loan share throughout the period.29
28Recall that all ratio variables were multiplied by 100. This makes interpretation of the odds ratios more
practical, as a one-unit increase in the explanatory variable can now be interpreted as a “one percent” increase
in the original proportion. An odds ratio above one increases the likelihood of survival, whereas an odds ratio
below one decreases it.
29The relative insignificance of other re will be explained in more detail in the next section.
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Note that in Chicago, depositors in theory could know which banks held the most in
mortgages thanks to official publications of balance sheet summaries every six months. The
fact that differences in withdrawals did widen to some extent after June 1931 may be
explained by a learning effect on the part of creditors. As creditors witnessed withdrawals and
the failure of banks with the largest amounts of mortgages in the first episode, they withdrew
more from banks with larger amounts of such assets subsequently. However this information
effect cannot entirely explain, for instance, why survivors themselves ended up losing nearly 60
percent of their deposits.
The role of mortgages
The previous section established that widespread withdrawals affected all banks and that
mortgage holdings predict the timing of bank failure. It remains to determine exactly how
mortgage holdings led to failure. This could have happened either through mortgages’ quality
or their inherent lack of liquidity, and there are three reasons to prefer the latter explanation.
First, loan-to-value ratios (LTVs) for commercial bank mortgages at the time rarely
exceeded 50 percent, which is particularly low by today’s standards. In Chicago in particular,
a survey conducted in 1925 indicates that the average LTV on residential properties varied
from 41.3 percent to 50.5 percent (Bayless and Bodfish 1928).30 This has been emphasized by
both Field (2013) and White (2009). Given that land values in Chicago did not fall by more
than 50 percent until 1933, and that most Chicago banks failed before then (see Table 2),
banks could not have made any substantial losses on these loans, even after foreclosure. Hoyt
(1933, p. 399) documents the fall in land values, using sales and real estate brokers’ opinions
rather than assessments for tax purposes. He shows that values in Chicago as a whole fell by 5
percent in 1929, 20 percent in 1930, 38 percent in 1931, 50 percent in 1932 and 60 percent in
1933. We cannot know whether the bulk of the “1933” decline occurred before or after the
national bank holiday in March 1933. On p. 172 Hoyt actually asserts that “the decline in the
value of improved properties from 1928 to 1933 was 50 per cent,” not 60 per cent (Hoyt 1933).
Second, Hoyt (1933, pp. 259, 267)’s geographical data on land values suggests that these
30See also Morton (1956). First mortgages on apartments encumbered by a second mortgage (the majority of
cases for apartments) had an average LTV of 54.7 percent. In other cases (especially when apartments were not
encumbered by a second mortgage) LTVs could go up to 59.9 percent. Interest rates on average reached around
6 percent (ibid.).
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Table 5: Percentage of banks by cohort falling into one of the three
categories of cumulative value decline from 1926 to 1931 (lowest to
highest)
Fall in land
values
June 1931
Failures
June 1932
Failures
June 1933
Failures
Survivors
0 36.96 28.57 30.77 45.45
1 58.70 68.57 38.46 48.48
2 4.35 2.86 30.77 6.06
Total 100 100 100 100
Source: Hoyt (1933, pp. 259, 267) and Statements.
were uncorrelated with bank failure rates. Although Hoyt’s land value variable is categorical,
his maps are sufficiently detailed to allow efficient matching with my balance sheet data.
Using banks’ contemporary addresses in Chicago. I thus generated a new categorical variable,
valuefall, which includes three categories of cumulative fall in residential land values per front
foot from 1926 to 1931 (from lowest to highest) in each bank’s location.31 As mentioned
earlier, most banks catered to their own neighbourhoods, so that land values in their own
location would likely have had the highest impact on their health. Hoyt chose 1931 to
illustrate the geographical pattern of falls in land values in the city because this was when the
first sharp decline in values occurred (ibid., p. 266). It is reasonable to assume that subsequent
falls in land values followed the initial geographical pattern in terms of differences in intensity.
Table 5 shows the percent of banks in each cohort by category of value decline. There are
few differences within the three failing cohorts, so that falls in land values do not point to any
possible correlation between falls in land values between 1926 and 1931 and those cohorts’
timing of failure. In addition, although survivors seem to have experienced less of a decline in
values than all other cohorts together, many survivors were very large banks from the Loop,
where land values were more stable throughout the period. Controlling for size may therefore
be important when assessing the role of land value falls. More generally, should there be any
relationship between land values and bank failures, it may not be a directly causal one:
locations experiencing a larger fall in land values may also be areas in which banks simply
made larger amounts of mortgages in the 1920s, which may lead land values to be related to
31This variable was generated using the two maps shown in Figures 42 and 47 in Hoyt (1933, pp. 259, 267).
For these maps he used sales data from Olcott’s Land Values black Book of Chicago and land assessment data
from Jacob (1931). These maps are divided into grids, and a bank’s location is one of the 219 squares on each
grid. Each square’s size is about 2.5 squared kilometers.
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bank failures only indirectly and not through loan losses. Controlling for other financial ratios
may therefore also be important. Table 6 reports estimates of the same ordered logistic model
as before, only with 1929 balance sheet variables on the right-hand side and the added
valuefall variable. In the second column, this variable is interacted with mortgages to see
whether declines in land values had a stronger effect on banks that had invested more in real
estate loans. Neither the valuefall variable nor its interaction term are significant.
A simple t-test reveals that deposit losses among all cohorts are uncorrelated with falls in
land values. This holds for deposit losses up to December 1930 (Prob > F = 0.701) as well as
for deposit losses up to December 1931 (Prob > F = 0.080).
The fact that banks’ losses did not have a large impact on bank failure can also be seen in
the low predictive power of capital ratios throughout the period (see Table 4). As Figure 4
suggests, June 1931 failures had the highest ratio of capital to total assets through most of the
1920s, despite being the first cohort to fail.32
The third and final reason to favour liquidity over quality as an explanation of bank
failures is that mortgages were particularly difficult to liquidate. In the interwar period
mortgages could neither be sold in the secondary market nor rediscounted at the Federal
32[FOOTNOTE DELETED].
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Table 6: Ordered logistic model of bank failure (odds
ratios), (dependent variable: failure type; explanatory
variables: June 1929 balance sheet items and valuefall)
(1) (2)
size 1.190 1.166
(.27) (.27)
capital 1.011 1.001
(.03) (.04)
reserve dep 1.009 1.006
(.02) (.02)
gvtbonds 1.149** 1.153**
(.07) (.07)
secloans 1.028 1.025
(.02) (.02)
other re .797 .809
(.19) (.19)
otherloans .985 .987
(.02) (.02)
bankhouse 1.003 1.010
(.06) (.06)
rearnings 1.055** 1.057**
(.03) (.03)
age 1.262 1.244
(.54) (.5)
mortgages .927*** .897***
(.03) (.04)
valuefall 1.069 .540
(.35) (.37)
mortgages*valuefall 1.045
(.04)
n 126 126
Prob > chi2 .000 .000
Likelihood -136.83 -136.17
Notes: The variable valuefall is a categorical variable consist-
ing in three categories of intensity in cumulative falls in land
values from 1926 to 1931 based on Hoyt (1933), from lowest
to highest (see text for further details on the computation of
this variable). *** significant at α = 0.01, ** significant at
α = 0.05, * significant at α = 0.10. Odds ratios with stan-
dard errors based on the original coefficients in parentheses.
An odds ratio above one increases the likelihood of survival,
whereas an odds ratio below one decreases it. Each ratio vari-
able has been multiplied by 100 so that a one unit increase
can be interpreted as a one percentage increase in the ratio.
Source: Statements.
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Reserve. In early 1932 the Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC) proposed to lend
against “ineligible” collateral, which could include high quality real estate loans. Nevertheless
loans against such assets remained proportionately small because the RFC preferred loans
with maturities of fewer than six months (Calomiris, Mason, Weidenmier, and Bobroff 2013)
and refused to lend against real estate loans’ book value, likely taking into account their
uncertain quality paramount to their long maturity (Wigmore 1995, p.324). In general the
RFC remained very cautious and lent against mainly high-quality and liquid collateral, until
1933 when it switched to preferred stock purchases in financial institutions (Calomiris and
Mason 2004; Calomiris et al. 2013; James 1938; Mason 2001).33
A more fundamental cause of the illiquidity of mortgages was their long contract maturity
relative to other loans, usually between three and five years. Their de facto maturity in the
1920s was even longer as it was customary for banks to renew mortgages. As Saulnier made
clear in his 1956 study of 1920s mortgage lending in the United States, “the much lauded
feature of full repayment by maturity has been won at the price of extended maturities” (see
Morton (1956, p. 8) and Chapman and Willis (1934, p. 602)).34 This created strong
expectations of renewal on the part of borrowers. After three or five years, having only made
the initial down payments and interest payments, they expected to be given another three to
five years to make the final “balloon” payment. An informed commentator from the 1950s
gave a vivid description of the phenomenon:
What usually happened was that the average family went along, budgeting for
the interest payments on the mortgage, subconsciously regarding the mortgage
itself as written for an indefinite period, as if the lender were never going to want
his money back (...). This impression was strengthened by the fact that lenders
most frequently did renew the mortgage over and over again when money was
plentiful” (Federal Home Loan Bank Board 1952, pp. 2-5).
While many loans were made in the boom years of 1925 to 1927 (see Figure 5), those
maturing between 1929 and 1930 were likely renewed and would not actually come due before
33In addition, around the same time the Banking Act of 1932 also allowed the Federal Reserve to widen its
accepted collateral for rediscounts. According to Friedman and Schwartz (1963, p. 45), however, such powers
were used only to a very limited extent, perhaps for the same reason. See also Mason (2001) and Wicker (1996,
p.85).
34Note that Morton’s data come from an NBER survey of urban mortgage lending, whose absolute precision
may be taken with care. The survey was made in 1947 on a sample of 170 surviving commercial banks of all
sizes, “representing about one-third of the commercial banks total nonfarm mortgage portfolio as of mid-1945”
(ibid., p. 71).
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1932-35.35 Loans maturing for the first time during the Depression would come up for
expected renewal, and banks under liquidity pressure would urge unprepared borrowers to pay
back their loans. Both cases could create a liquidity shortage, and in the latter, banks may
have even been induced to foreclose.
Foreclosure likely would not entail any significant loss thanks to the 50 percent LTV.
After foreclosure either the property could be auctioned off to external buyers or, if there were
no buyers, the property was repossessed by the bank at an appraisal price. Such repossessed
property then sat on the bank’s books as non-performing assets (called “other real estate”)
until they could be sold again later. The foreclosure price could potentially be lower than the
current “market” price. Nevertheless in Depression Chicago transactions were few,
foreclosures widespread (Hoyt 1933, p. 266-272), and sales prices were probably themselves
affected by foreclosures in surrounding areas (this theoretical point is made by Campbell,
Giglio, and Pathak (2011); see also Genesove and Mayer (2001)). This suggests that gaps
between foreclosure and sales prices may not have been very large.
The problem with foreclosures lay elsewhere: the foreclosure process in Illinois lasted more
than eighteen months on average (Child 1925; Gries and Ford 1932; Hoppe 1926; Johnson
1923).36 As the vice-president of the banking department of the First National Trust and
Savings Bank in Chicago put it:
“As to retaining homes, I have heard a lot of talk about foreclosures and that
the banks are calling loans and insisting upon repayment and that the borrowers
are unable to refund elsewhere, and they are doing this because they are trying to
keep their assets liquid. In our State it takes us, at a minimum, 18 months to
foreclose a loan, and it will probably be closer to two years and a half, before we
acquire title. We are certainly not maintaining our liquid condition by foreclosing
loans.” (U.S. Congress 1932, part 2, p. 269).
Corroborating evidence can be found in Federal Home Loan Bank Board (1934), which
mentions “the dangers attendant on the mortgagee’s refusal to renew,” and in Federal Home
Loan Bank Board (1952), which reports: “The time of stress came in 1929-30; the short-term
mortgage came to maturity against a situation of tight credit and, in many cases, of no credit
35See in particular Morton (1956, p. 174).
36See also Anderson (1927), Hopper (1927), Stalker (1925), and Postel-Vinay (2014). While there is no data
on foreclosure rates, Hoyt (1933, p. 269-270) remarks that “foreclosures were mounting rapidly, the number
increasing from 5,818 in 1930 to 10,075 in 1931 (...), [and] reached a new peak in 1932, rising to (...) 15,201.”
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Figure 5: New mortgages and trust deeds, Cook County, Illinois ($)
Note: the source does not specify whether new mortgages include renewed mortgages. Source:
Hoyt (1933, p.475).
(...). All too often the lender (...) did not want to renew the loan to the home-owner no
matter how high the premium or rate of interest.”37
Long maturities and long foreclosure times posed a tremendous challenge to banks. Their
effect on bank balance sheets can be seen in Figures 3, 6 and 12. Figure 3 showed how real
estate loans increased as a share of total assets for all banks during the Depression, at the
same time as assets as a whole were diminishing.38 By contrast, other types of loans were
promptly liquidated in this period. Figure 6 shows the falling share of loans on collateral
security owned by banks, while Figure 12 in the Appendix shows a similar decline in other
loans as a share of total assets.39 Compared to other assets, therefore, mortgages were
particularly difficult to liquidate.40
The fate of the variable “other real estate” may seem inconsistent with this conclusion.
Other real estate is an asset consisting of property repossessed by banks after real estate
foreclosures and before it can be resold. One might question the importance of this variable in
37Note, in addition, that second mortgage financing made prompt repayment even less likely – see Postel-Vinay
(2014).
38For a graph of total assets see Figure 14 in the Appendix
39Security loans were usually used to carry securities and were repayable at the option of the lender within
twenty-four hours’ notice, with the securities themselves used as collateral. According to Bogen and Willis (1929,
p. 245), “depositors can, and sometimes do, determine the calling of loans by the activity of their own demands.”
Other loans were short-term commercial loans, often sought by companies for the seasonal expansion of their
inventories. Both types of loans were eligible for rediscount at the Federal Reserve Banks or could be sold in the
open market (Bogen and Willis 1929; U.S. Congress 1927).
40Surprisingly perhaps, cash is not a good predictor of failure. This suggests that cash ratios were relatively
similar for all four cohorts, and that what really differentiated them were their mortgage holdings. Government
bonds were more important than cash, as can be seen in Table 4 and Figure 8 in the Appendix.
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explaining bank failures given the very low percentages shown in Figure 13 in the Appendix,
which never go much beyond 3 percent, and given the low significance of this variable in the
ordered logit model. This can be explained, first, by the fact that mortgages’ impact on bank
failure could have been strong without any foreclosures taking place. When foreclosures did
occur, it is precisely their very lengthy process that would have created liquidity problems for
banks. Each cohort’s last data point represents its status at the last call before failure, and
each call occurred only every six months. This means that if many banks failed between April
and June, which was the case for the first two failing cohorts, it is likely that much of their
repossessed property would not have been recorded by December before this date. Thus, the
lengthy foreclosure process increases the odds that many of the effects of foreclosure are not
visible on this graph (Child 1925; Hoppe 1926; Johnson 1923).41
Conclusion
This study of the long-term behaviour of Chicago banks in the 1920s has yielded new insights
into the causes of bank failures in the 1930s. I have argued that banks’ long-term investments
41Further comments on the value of repossessed property after foreclosure are made earlier in this sub-section.
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in illiquid assets (especially mortgages) severely weakened their position when they faced large
withdrawals on their deposits. Though restricted to Chicago, these results reassert the role
that liquidity issues played in the Great Depression, both on the liability and the asset sides of
the balance sheet. More specifically, they suggest that a solvent but ex ante less liquid bank is
not necessarily healthy, and that liquidity risk management is just as important as credit risk
management when the risk of bank runs is greater than zero.
This paper has also reassessed the role that mortgage investments played in the Great
Depression via the banking channel. Parallels with the recent crisis may be drawn, despite
major differences in mortgage contracts then and now. In both cases, banks suffered
tremendous liquidity shocks on the uninsured liability side of their balance sheets. These
shocks highlighted the impact of maturity mismatches between long-term assets and
short-term liabilities (Brunnermeier 2008; Gorton and Metrick 2012). Securitization can
potentially increase the liquidity of mortgages by making them more salable and by
distributing different kinds of risks to different types of investors. But securitization needs to
be undertaken in the right way (see Postel-Vinay (2013)).
Central banks can in theory help during a liquidity crisis by following Bagehot’s rule and
lending on good collateral. Although central banks play an essential role during crises, it is
always difficult for them to gauge the precise quality (credit risk) of an asset – especially if the
asset is a long-term one, thereby creating more uncertainty about its long-term value
(Goodhart 2008, 2010). By lending against such doubtful collateral as mortgage-backed
securities, the Federal Reserve has had a controversial role in the recent crisis (Bordo and
Landon-Lane 2010; Schleifer and Vishny 2011; Gorton and Metrick 2013; Stein 2013).42
Because central bank help will likely never be entirely adequate, it is important for
commercial banks to attend to the inherent liquidity of their portfolios. Of course, nowadays
assets’ liquidity increasingly depends on their underlying quality as their tradeability varies
with their perceived quality. Nevertheless some assets, especially longer-term ones, are still
inherently less liquid than others either because of the slow underlying cash flow itself or
because of the uncertainty attached to their long maturity.
No bank will ever be perfectly hedged in terms of its maturity profile, but promoting
42And by purchasing such securities outright, it cut across the boundary between monetary and fiscal policy
(Reinhart 2011).
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liquidity in a preventive regulatory framework, perhaps through countercyclical cash ratios,
would be a good start. In this paper, cash did not matter in the sense that differences in
mortgage holdings made a larger difference. But we may conjecture that, had banks holding
more mortgages also held more cash, they would not have responded so badly to bank runs.43
[Last sentences deleted]
43Note that government bonds mattered more than cash, as can be seen in Table 4 and Figure 8 in the
Appendix. See also Calomiris, Heider, and Hoerova (2012), Goodhart (2008, 2010) and Shin (2009).
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Appendix
Sources, name changes and consolidations
This study uses the Statements of State Banks of Illinois. The Reports of Condition from the
Office of the Comptroller of Currency focus on all member banks (both state and national)
nationwide at disaggregated levels, and contain very detailed information on individual banks,
including qualitative information. For my study these reports would have proved insufficient:
the extant reports for state member banks are available for the same dates as the Statements
and are less complete since they include only state member banks, and for national member
banks the only available reports are for December 1929 and December 1931.44 There are no
reports for 1930, which is an important year for this research. Focusing on state banks should
not be a problem since in December 1929 state banks made up 95.5 percent of all banks in the
city (University of Illinois Bulletin 1929) and 87.6 percent of all suspensions, whereas national
banks accounted for only 12.4 percent of suspensions (White 1984).
Creating cohorts is an essential way of keeping track of the same sample of banks, whether
failures or survivors (aside from its advantages for economic analysis). Another essential
feature of this aim is linked to name changes and consolidations. As previously mentioned, I
had all the data needed for this purpose. Name changes were corrected in 26 instances.
However, I still had to make decisions about whether to include a merger or acquisition in the
failing or surviving categories. Most authors include such consolidations as failures; that is, a
bank that was taken over is usually considered a failure, and so are both of the banks that
merged, even when the merger itself ended up surviving the Depression. For instance,
Calomiris and Mason (2003) specify that their data “contain almost seventy different ways a
bank can exit the dataset, ranging from all imaginable types of mergers and acquisitions to
relatively simple voluntary liquidations and receiverships; [...] together, we term [them]
failures.” The Reports of Condition they used were more detailed in this respect, and I do not
have data on all types of mergers and acquisitions. Nevertheless, the Rand McNally directory
gives sufficient detail at least on whether a merger or a simple takeover occurred.
As in Calomiris and Mason (2003) I thought reasonable to count as failures banks that
were taken over by other banks. This occurred in 14 cases since June 1929. The banks that
44Details of the available volumes are described in Mason (1998).
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Table 7: State mergers between June 1929 and June 1933
Bank 1 Bank 2 New merger First
reporting
date
Failing?
The Foreman
Trust and
Savings Bank
State Bank Foreman-State
Trust and
Savings Bank
Dec 1929 Yes, June
1931
Roosevelt State
Bank
Bankers State
Bank
Roosevelt-
Bankers State
Bank
June 1930 Yes, Aug
1930
Builders and
Merchants State
Bank
Capital State
Savings Bank
Builders and
Merchants Bank
and Trust Co
Nov 1930 Yes, April
1931
Central Trust Co
of Illinois
Chicago Trust Co Central Republic
Bank and Trust
Co
July 1931 No
Sources: Statements, and Rand Mc Nally Bankers’ Directory.
were taken over before June 1929 are not taken into account in the sense that only the
resulting consolidation should be part of a cohort. Exactly the same applies to pre-June 1929
mergers: only the resulting merger can be part of a cohort and thus only this bank will be
tracked down as early as possible in the 1920s. Table 7 shows the state mergers that occurred
since June 1929 and whether the merger ended up failing or not.
For the mergers that had failed by June 1933, there is no apparent dilemma regarding
how to classify the original consolidating banks. That is, when a merger ended up failing, the
two original banks’ data could be kept until they merge under a new name, at which point the
new merger’s data could be excluded from the dataset, making the two original banks failures
at the time of consolidation. Yet this decision sounds slightly arbitrary given the fact that a
healthy bank may have merged with a less healthy bank which may have dragged the former
into bankruptcy. In the first and third cases shown in Table 7, it was actually possible to
divide the merger’s balance sheet in two proportional parts and make the two original banks
continue until the time the merger itself fails. In the second case, the merger itself fails in
August 1930 so could not be part of any cohort. Results are robust to different categorizations.
In the dataset only one state merger actually survived in Chicago: the Central Republic
Bank and Trust Co, a July 1931 consolidation of Central Trust Co of Illinois, Chicago Trust
Co and a national bank, the National Bank of the Republic. As in the previous cases, it was
decided that both state banks would be kept “alive” by taking the items on the balance sheet
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of the new merger and splitting them into parts proportional to each original banks share of
the total.45
Finally, it seems necessary to specifically discuss the case of the Continental Illinois Bank
and Trust Company, which was the largest bank in Chicago in 1929, and which with the First
National Bank (as its name indicates, a national bank) “towered over the Chicago money
market like giants” (James 1938, p. 952). Together they were responsible for about half the
business transacted in the city (ibid.). Initially this bank was not included in the sample, for
the simple reason that it apparently failed in December 1932 and thus could not be part of a
particular cohort. However, it was soon discovered that the “failure” of the bank was in fact
due to a rare phenomenon at the time: the fact that it adopted a national charter. The
Chicago Tribune titled in October 1932 “CONTINENTAL GETS NATIONAL BANK
CHARTER” which was at the time seen as a strange kind of event (Chicago Tribune, 1932).
One of the reasons this happened, as the article explained, is that national banking laws were
in the process of being changed to allow branching everywhere, including in states that
technically forbade it. As the crisis made clear to some bank managers the potential benefits
of branching, it is not surprising that a strong bank like Continental Illinois sought a national
charter, and was granted one.46 The bank was thus manually categorised as a survivor.
Deposit losses
Table 8 reports tests of differences between mean deposit growth rates.
Additional financial ratios
Figures 7, 8, 9 10, 11, 12 and 13 show the reserve-deposit ratio, U.S. government bonds,
banking house, borrowed funds, retained earnings to net worth, other loans and other real
estate. The relative importance of government bonds, which was also noted in Table 4, can
likely be explained by its important role in liquidity maintenance during crises.
45But again the results are robust either way.Calomiris and Mason (1997) emphasize that “Central Republic
was a solvent bank saved from failure by the collective intervention of other Loop banks.” This can be considered
as controversial however, as several sources point to political motives for its rescue (see in particular Vickers
(2011)). I also thank Joseph Mason for kindly making national bank data available to me.
46The adjective “strong” here is based on the fact that Continental Illinois in June 1929 had healthier ratios
than even the average of survivors. I do not know of any other state banks in Chicago which adopted a national
charter at that time.
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Table 8: Tests of differences between mean deposit growth rates
Survivors June 1931 June 1932 June 1933
(1) (2) (3) (1) (1) (2) (1) (2) (3)
Mean -.08 -.37 -.59 -.22 -.17 -.59 -.00 -.43 -.63
(.07) (.06) (.08) (.04) (.03) (.03) (.13) (.10) (.09)
June 1931
(t-stat)
1.806*
June 1932
(t-stat)
1.298 3.380*** -.995
June 1933
(t-stat)
-.527 .472 .366 -1.606 -1.288 -1.550
Observations 35 46 36 14
Notes: * significant at α = 0.01, ** significant at α = 0.05, *** significant at α = 0.10.
(1) June 1929 - Dec 1930 cumulative deposit losses;
(2) June 1929 - Dec 1931 cumulative deposit losses;
(3) June 1929 - Dec 1932 cumulative deposit losses.
First row gives the mean deposit growth rates (standard errors in parentheses). Next rows give t-
statistics of differences between two means. Source: Statements.
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Figure 7: Cash reserves to total deposits (cash, other cash resources, due from other banks)
Source: Statements.
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Figure 8: U.S. government bonds to total assets
Source: Statements.
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Figure 9: Banking house, furniture and fixtures to total assets
Source: Statements.
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Figure 10: Bills payable and rediscounts to total assets
Source: Statements.
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Figure 11: Retained earnings to net worth
Source: Statements.
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Figure 12: Other loans to total assets
Source: Statements.
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Figure 13: Other real estate to total assets
Source: Statements.
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Bills payable and rediscounts are a form of long-term, high interest debt, which is a good
indicator of bank trouble, as when deposits are withdrawn from risky banks, they are forced
to rely on high-cost debt (Calomiris and Mason 1997). Figure 10 thus shows banks’ race for
liquidity as they started losing deposits. In December 1931, for instance, when survivors lost
slightly fewer deposits than the June 1932 Failures, they also secured fewer funds from these
sources. Note however that the interpretation of this variable is not straightforward, as it
could also reflect creditors’ confidence (or lack thereof) in the bank.47
Discrete-time hazard estimates
Table 9 reports estimates of discrete time hazard models. As mentioned above, survival
models necessarily take into account within-Depression covariates and therefore cannot test
the importance of pre-Depression variables as well as ordered logit can. Adding time dummies
with interactions could potentially help, but with this particular dataset the hazard rate is
frequently zero in pre-Depression years, so that pre-Depression effects cannot be efficiently
estimated (time dummies are automatically omitted).
Nevertheless the results are of some interest. Both models are discrete-time proportional
odds (logit) models, chosen among other survival frameworks (such as continuous time
survival models) due to the frequency of the data, which is halfyearly. If T is survival time
and T = t the time of failure, then the discrete hazard for this model is:
λ(t | x) = P (T = t | T ≥ t, x) = exp(βt + γX)
1 + exp(βt + γX)
(2)
where β is the baseline hazard, X a vector of explanatory variables and γ a vector of
variable-specific parameters.
The first model in Table 9 assumes a constant baseline hazard, which may not be wholly
adapted to the dataset since the hazard rate greatly increased as the Depression unfolded. For
this reason a second model, assuming positive time duration, is estimated in the second
column. The time variable is very significant, and the McFadden R-squared much higher,
suggesting that this model is a better fit than the previous one. Odds ratios are reported,
47As a side note, the June 1932 spike for survivors and late failures may be due to a Reconstruction Finance
Corporation (RFC) plan to inject liquidity during the June 1932 crisis (Calomiris and Mason 1997).
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Table 9: Proportional odds discrete-time survival models, 1923-33 (binary
dependent variable equals one at the time of failure), odds ratios
Constant baseline
hazard (1)
Positive duration
dependence (2)
log(time) 2477.729***
(2374.94)
size 1.640*** .916
(.26) (.17)
capital 1.020 .945***
(.01) (.02)
reserve dep 1.002 1.001
(.00) (.00)
gvtbonds .961*** .953***
(.01) (.01)
secloans .998 1.009
(.02) (.01)
mortgages 1.088*** 1.084***
(.02) (.02)
other re 1.076* 1.054
(.05) (.07)
otherloans 1.064*** 1.064***
(.02) (.02)
bankhouse 1.036 1.055**
(.02) (.03)
rearnings .942*** .950**
(.02) (.02)
age .692 .638*
(.00) (.17)
n 1492 1492
Prob > chi2 .000 .000
McFadden R-squared .18 .41
Notes: *** significant at α = 0.01, ** significant at α = 0.05, * significant at
α = 0.10. Standard errors in parentheses. Odds ratios can be interpreted here
as hazard ratios. Hazard ratios between zero and one decrease the probability of
failure; hazard ratios above one increase it. Each variable has been multiplied by
100 so that a one unit increase can be interpreted as a one percentage increase in
the ratio. Source: Statements.
which in such models can be interpreted as hazard ratios. Hazard ratios between zero and one
decrease the probability of failure; hazard ratios above one increase it.
In this model it can be seen that many variables are significant – more so than in the
ordered logit models. This could be interpreted as a sign that the Depression exacerbated
differences between banks. The most powerful variable, however, remains mortgages to total
asset, with a hazard ratio of 1.084.
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Problems with unit banking
In the 1920s all Chicago state banks operated under the unit banking system; they were not
allowed to open branches as Illinois banking law forbade it. Problems linked to unit banking
were numerous. The main reason branch banking is usually thought of as an advantage is that
it increases portfolio diversification. Branch banking can be contrasted to group or
chain-banking as branches of the same bank can pool their assets and liabilities together.
When there is a liquidity shortage at one of the banks in a chain, other member banks cannot
simply transfer funds to that bank for help, a problem which does not even arise in the branch
banking system. This may partly explain the collapse of the Bain chain in June 1931 which
triggered the banking crisis at that time (James 1938, p. 994).
Yet the lack of portfolio diversification was not necessarily directly due to the unit
banking system. Indeed, Rodkey points to the fact that many small bankers prior to the
Depression felt a moral duty to “meet all demands for good local loans” (Rodkey, 1944, p. 4).
It also seems that the lack of portfolio diversification was not the only disadvantage of unit
banking. Rodkey blamed this system for fostering the incompetence of bank managers:
“This system leads naturally to a multiplicity of small banks under local
control, owned locally, and operated usually by citizens of the home community
who may or may not have some knowledge of the fundamental principles of sound
banking” (Rodkey 1935, p. 147).
Thus, by triggering the establishment of many small banks, unit banking made it easier
for inexperienced bankers to become managers.48 Rodkey also pointed out that little attention
was given to the ability of the borrower to meet his interest payments (ibid., p. 122).
The ease with which almost any kind of manager could open a small community bank and
the resulting lack of experience of such unit bank managers in Illinois stand out as potentially
serious problems when the Chicago mortgage boom is taken into account.
48Nevertheless, the debate on branch banking has not completely ended. So far, at least four studies have
shown that the branch banking system was detrimental to bank survival during the Depression. While Calomiris
and Wheelock (1995) concede that it has usually been a good thing in U.S. history, they find that such was not
the case in the Great Depression. Some of the largest branching networks collapsed in the 1930s, which may
have been due to a form of moral hazard: branching banks thought they were better protected against local risk,
and thus were less careful with their asset management (see also Carlson (2001)). Calomiris and Mason (2003)
confirm the negative effect of branch banking, and so does Carlson (2001). On the other hand, Mitchener (2005)
finds a positive effect, while Gambs (1977) finds no effect at all.
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Bank size
This appendix deals with the problem of bank size. First of all, it should be noted that bank
size is not necessarily a problem in the sense that it does not necessarily introduce bias in the
results. Most of the time it does not because authors make a point of studying mainly
financial ratios. When looking at the main indicators of bank size (total assets, total capital,
and sometimes total deposits), it appears that larger banks did tend to have a higher survivor
rate. However, one of the aims of this paper is precisely to show that this was certainly not
the only reason for their survival (of course, it may be that there is a correlation between
larger bank size and better management practice). Table 10 shows the failure rate per size
group, using the whole population of 193 banks (see notes below Table 2).
Table 10: Relationship between bank size and failure rate, June
1929 - June 1933
Total Capital Number of banks Number of
failures
Failure rate
(%)
Less than
$250,000
87 77 89
$250,001 -
$375,000
16 14 88
$375,001 -
$800,000
45 36 80
More than
$800,000
45 33 73
Notes: There are 193 banks in total in this table because they include those
that are not part of any cohort, eg. those that failed between the chosen
windows of failure. The actual bank total for June 1929 as the sum of each
cohort is 131. Source: Statements.
From this table it appears that there is indeed a relationship between size and failure,
although this relationship is not very strong. True, whether large or small, banks had a high
failure rate, always above 70 percent. Nevertheless, it is still noticeable that banks with less
than $250,000 in capital had 89 percent chances of failing, whereas banks whose capital went
beyond $800,000 “only” had a failure rate of 73 percent. Looking at total assets for the whole
period, the differences are even more striking (see Figure 14).
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Figure 14: Total assets
Source: Statements.
Mortgage growth rates
One may wonder how a non-increasing share of real estate to total assets may have
substantially weakened banks. First note that the data only start in 1923, which was already
some way into the boom. The real estate boom may also be hidden by the fact that banks
grew significantly throughout the 1920s. This is shown in Figures 15 and 16. Figure 15
represents the median growth rate of mortgages as an absolute value, a useful (albeit highly
approximate) measure in the absence of data on new mortgages made by year. It shows
substantial growth rates between 1923 and 1927 for all cohorts, as well as the fact that June
1931 failures always had a higher growth rate than June 1932 failures, which had a higher
growth rate than survivors (the June 1933 failures cohort, in light grey for better visibility,
behaves much more erratically, as is often the case).
The graph of the median growth rate of total assets looks similar (see Figure 16),
although most cohorts had a slightly higher mortgage than asset growth rate. It is interesting
to see that the June 1931 failure cohort grew particularly fast in the mid-1920s.
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Survival model for the liability side
Table 11 provides a discrete-time proportional odds model for the liability side of bank
balance sheets. The focus is on the years 1929-1933. As borrowed funds and deposit losses are
highly correlated, they were entered separately in the regression. All items are ratios to total
liabilities and equity except for retained earnings to net worth.
Table 11: Discrete-time proportional odds estimation, 1929-33
(binary dependent variable equals one at the time of failure),
odds ratios
(1) (2)
Capital 1.008 .982
(.01) (.01)
Retained earnings .939*** .941***
(.02) (.02)
Borrowed funds 1.043***
(.01)
Total deposits .972***
(.01)
n 885 885
Prob > chi2 .000 .000
Likelihood -284.22 -287.12
Notes: *** significant at α = 0.01, ** significant at α = 0.05, *
significant at α = 0.10. Standard errors in parentheses. Odds ratios
can be interpreted here as hazard ratios. Hazard ratios between zero
and one decrease the probability of failure; hazard ratios above one
increase it. Each variable has been multiplied by 100 so that a one
unit increase can be interpreted as a one percentage increase in the
ratio.Source: Statements.
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